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COURT OF APPEALS, 1962 TERM
of confining uncooperative witnesses to lengthy confinements for non-compliance
with court orders. 15
Judge Van Voorhis in dissenting offered a logical common sense approach
in rejecting the majority opinion, "It makes little difference whether a person
is asked the same or related questions 17 times on one day, or on 17 different
days. In each instance he should be found guilty of but a single criminal con-
tempt."' 6 The dissent was realistically concerned over the possible abuses that
might result from zealous prosecutions, and the fundamental personal liberties
that were being unnecessarily jeopardized by the majority's determination. Ac-
cording to Judge Van Voorhis any defendants confronted with successive criminal
contempts ought to be granted a jury trial for perjury to finalize the issue.'
7
The instant case represents an inevitable, yet unfortunately common by-
product of American jurisprudence-confusion. By an historically dictated
method for splitting hairs between analogous factual situations the New York
courts are now facing a dilemma: they must now uphold and defend opposing
rules of law. At one extreme, a witness will only be in contempt once if the
refusals to answer are confined to a single hearing.' 8 If on the other hand an
unfortunate witness, like defendant Cirillo, is recalled at a later date to testify
he will be in danger of further incarceration. 9 Should this issue come before the
courts again perhaps a closer scrutiny might help to amend the self imposed
inconsistency.
Thomas E. Webb
DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS
SELF-DEALING BY TRUSTEE'S ATTORNEY DiD NOT VITIATE REAL ESTATE SALE
The Chase Manhattan Bank petitioned Kings County Surrogate's Court
to render and settle their intermediate account as sole surviving executor and
trustee of the estate of Thomas A. Clarke. The Surrogate's Court confirmed the
report of its appointed referee and dismissed the two objections of one of the
beneficiaries. The two objections were that the sale of certain real estate by the
executor was improvident and that the fee granted executor's attorney was im
proper. The basis of this latter charge was that the attorney had received a per-
centage of the brokerage commission. This improper payment to the attorney,
however, was quite indirect. The property had been listed with one agent, Seward,
with whom the attorney had agreed to split any commission. A second agent,
Tilton, produced the ultimate purchaser but was nevertheless prevailed upon by
the attorney to give part of his brokerage fee to the first agent, Seward, who, in
15. Instant case at 209, 188 N.E.2d at 140, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. People v. Riela, 7 N.Y.2d 571, 166 N.E.2d 840, 200 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1960).
19. See cases at note 11 supra.
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turn, split the amount with the attorney. The executor knew nothing of these
payments until long after the actual sale. The sale was consummated directly
between the bank as executor and Tilton's principal without the intercession of
the attorney. The product of this direct dealing was an increase of 20% in sale
price. In a per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the propriety of
the land sale but refused to allow any fee for the attorney. When the executor
took over negotiations and succeeded in raising the sale price considerably, the
prior machinations of its attorney did not taint the sale of the land. The agree-
ment of the attorney with the broker for a split of the commission, however, put
him in a position of divided loyalty and he thereby breached his fiduciary duty
and must be denied any compensation. Matter of Clarke, 12 N.Y.2d 183, 188
N.E.2d 128, 237 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1962).
A fiduciary is held to a higher standard than the morals of the market
place.' Fraud is applicable to activity on the part of a fiduciary which would be
innocent in a non-fiduciary setting 2 A trustee, as fiduciary, has two basic duties:
he must be prudent and diligent in his management of the trust and he must
have undivided loyalty to his cestui.4 As to the requirement of prudence and
diligence, the trustee must employ such diligence as prudent men employ in the
management of their own affairs.5 He is not, however, expected to be infallible.0
The fiduciary's duty of undivided loyalty is particularly strong in the case of
trustees.7 The mere existence of a personal claim entangling the trustee's private
interests with those of the beneficiaries' is frequently sufficient to warrant con-
duct being branded as a breach of the fiduciary duty.8 The Court will always
scrutinize very closely a trustee's conduct where he has an interest adverse to
that of the beneficiary.9 The determination of whether these standards have
been met by a trustee, is one of facts to be found by the trial court. 10
The self-dealing trustee is open to several types of penalties for his mis-
conduct. A surcharge equaling the difference between what should have been
received and what was received may be levied against him." He may be denied
fees' 2 or removed from office by the Surrogate.1 3 With respect to specific trans-
actions consummated by the self-dealing trustee, the beneficiary, assuming no
1. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (one partner
entered a new business).
2. See Costello v. Costello, 209 N.Y. 252, 103 N.E. 148 (1913) (constructive fraud).
3. King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 85 (1869).
4. See Matter of Estate of Weston, 91 N.Y. 502 (1883).
5. King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 86 (1869).
6. In re Baker's Estate, 249 App. Div. 265, 292 N.Y.S. 122 (4th Dep't 1936).
7. See 2 Scott, Trusts § 170 (1st ed. 1939).
8. See In re Bond & Mortgage Guar. Co., 303 N.Y. 423, 103 N.E.2d 721 (1952); Bogert,
Trusts & Trustees §§ 543, 544 (2d ed. 1960).
9. See In re Peabody's Will, 198 Misc. 505, 96 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Sup. Ct.), afl'd, 277
App. Div. 905, 98 N.Y.S.2d 614 (2d Dep't 1950).
10. In re Hubbell's Will, 302 N.Y. 246, 258, 97 N.E.2d 888, 893 (1951).
11. See In re Bausch's Estate, 280 App. Div. 482, 115 N.Y.S.2d 278 (4th Dep't 1952).
12. See Matter of Bushe, 227 N.Y. 85, 124 N.E. 154 (1919); In re Hayes, 40 Misc. 500,
82 N.Y. Supp. 792 (Surr. Ct. 1903).
13. See In re Wechsler's Estate, 171 Misc. 738, 13 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Surr. Ct. 1939) (ex-
ecutor who was also retained as counsel removed by surrogate).
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bona fide purchaser has entered the picture, has the choice of avoiding them or
treating them as binding and effective.14 Generally, the good intent of the
trustee is irrelevant nor is it important whether the transaction attacked was
fair and for an adequate consideraiton.15 The attorney for a trustee is a fiduciary
of the beneficiary and as such is bound by the same rule of undivided loyalty. 6
Counsel fees are allowable by the Surrogate only for faithful performance of his
duty17 and he must be denied all compensation when he has placed himself in a
position of divided loyalty.' 8 While a trustee could be charged with his attorney's
malfeasance, 19 there is no basis for surcharge when there is no evidence of the
executor's knowledge of or participation in this malfeasance. If this were not so,
an innocent and diligent trustee could be held liable for the secret, independent
and corrupt act of a delinquent associate.20
In order to prevent being called upon to render post facto analyses of trust
real estate sales, the Court, in the instant case has refused to overturn the trial
court's fact finding by holding a specific transaction improvident as a matter of
law. Trust fund investments invariably involve prognosis by the -trustee. To force
the Court to attempt to determine the reasonableness of every such prognosis-
would be unduly burdensome. This is avoided by leaving this question to the
jury subject only to review when the improvidence of the trustee is so clear as to
be improvident as a matter of law.2 ' The problem presented by the attorney's
dealings was a more complex and perplexing one. A holding that the attorney
had breached his fiduciary duty, thereby obviating his claim for a fee, could
sustain a demand by objectant that the particular sale be invalidated.22 The
Court, however, resolved this difficulty by a two-step analysis. In the first step
they held that the admitted relationship between the agent and the attorney
placed the attorney in a position of divided loyalty.28 This position is in itself
sufficient to deny the attorney any compensation whatsoever.24 In step two,
however, the Court holds that the fact-finder was justified in finding that the
attorney's machinations did not taint the sale and therefore the sale stands.
Therefore, misdealing by a fiduciary insulated from a particular transaction
does not invalidate the transaction.
The decision appears to do justice to the particular litigants involved. In
so doing, the Court has not required the executor to be clairvoyant nor has it
14. See 2 Scott, op. cit. supra note 7, § 170.2.
15. See Bogert, op. cit. supra note 8, § 543.
16. In re Bond & Mortgage Guar. Co., 303 N.Y. 423, 430, 103 N.E.2d 721, 725 (1952).
17. Cf. Chatfield v. Simonson, 92 N.Y. 209, 215 (1883); Klein v. Twentieth Century
Fox Int. Corp., 201 Misc. 132, 108 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
18. See In re Jones Estate, 8 N.Y.2d 24, 28, 167 N.E.2d 336, 200 N.Y.S.2d 638, 641
(1960).
19. See, e.g., In re Hayes, 40 Misc. 500, 82 N.Y. Supp. 792 (Surr. Ct. 1903); In re
Remsen, 255 App. Div. 810, 7 N.Y.S.2d 350 (2d Dep't 1938).
20. See In re Wechsler's Estate, 171 Misc. 738, 13 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
21. See Purdy v. Lynch, 145 N.Y. 462, 40 N.E. 232 (1895).
22. See 2 Scott, op. cit. supra note 7, § 170.2.
23. See In re Bond & Mortgage Guar. Co., 303 N.Y. 423, 103 N.E.2d 721 (1952).
24. See In re Jones' Estate, 8 N.Y.2d 24, 167 N.E.2d 336, 200 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1960).
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allowed a fiduciary who maintained something less than undivided loyalty to be
compensated. The background of facts support strongly the Surrogate's finding
that the attorney's machinations did not taint the sale of the land. The attorney
was the husband of one of the four beneficiaries. 25 It is unlikely that his design
would be to effect a quick sale of the property in order to realize an immediate
$800.00 where he faced the possibility of a larger commission should the prop-
erty sell for more. By urging such a quick sale, the attorney would also jeopardize
his wife's interest by an amount approximating $7,500, i.e., 4 of $30,000,
the amount by which the executor was able to increase this offer. However, as-
suming that the lawyer had such a design, it does not follow that the executor
thwarted that design by stepping in late in the negotiations. There was ample
evidence to show that the executor's evaluation of the property was strongly
influenced by the attorney, who had been entrusted by the executor with the
investigation of the local real estate market and an on-site evaluation of the
property. It would appear then that the Court may have engaged in an ameliora-
tion of the rule of undivided loyalty. It may no longer be sufficient to show that
the agent of a fiduciary breached his trust but additionally proof as to the
agent's connection with a particular transaction appears now to be necessary.20
That such a change is desirable in order to avoid the hazards of post facto
analyses of the propriety of certain real estate sales by executors remains highly
dubious.
George P. Doyle
IRREVOCABLE ASSIGNMENT OF TRuST INCOME TO WIFE NoT VIOLATIVE OF
SPENDTHRIFT RULES IN CERTAIN CASES
In 1931 Mrs. Anna Knauth created an income trust for the benefit of her
son Oliver. Sixteen years later, pursuant to the terms of a voluntary support
agreement, Oliver made an "irrevocable assignment" to his wife of all said
trust in excess of one hundred dollars per month in lieu of his duty to support
his wife and the issue of their marriage. In an action by the trustees for a
judicial accounting, Oliver attacked the assignment as violative of the rule
against alienability of income trusts. From an adverse ruling of a referee
appointed by Supreme Court, Special Term and the Appellate Division,' Oliver
appealed to the Court of Appeals, held, affirmed, one Judge dissenting. Such
an assignment did not violate the rule against alienation of spendthrift trust
income in view of the beneficiaries sufficient remaining means to provide for
his own maintenance. In Matter of Knauth, 12 N.Y.2d, 259, 189 N.E.2d, 482,
238 N.Y.S.2d, 942 (1963).
25. Compare In re Dutchers Estate, 251 App. Div. 184, 295 N.Y. Supp. 643 (2d Dep't
1937).
26. But see, e.g., Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N.Y. 439, 154 N.E. 303 (1926); Albright v.
Jefferson County Nat'l Bank, 292 N.Y. 31, 53 N.E.2d 753 (1944), In re Lewisohn, 294 N.Y.
596, 63 N.E.2d 589 (1945); In re Ryan's Will, 291 N.Y. 376, 52 N.E. 909 (1943).
1. In the Matter of Knauth, 15 A.D.2d 778 (1st Dep't 1962).
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